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CHAPTER 12
The Baby and the Bath Water
Lessons for the Next Employment and Training Program
Burt S. Barnow
Christopher T. King
Although the nation's employment and training system has never
been particularly stable, the summer and fall of 1995 were particularly
noteworthy for the number and variety of approaches suggested to fix
the employment and training system (Barnow 1993). We use the term
"fix" with some misgivings, at least for adults, because the national
impact evaluation of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Title II
programs for economically disadvantaged adults and youth showed
gains of about $900 (in 1993 dollars) annually for adults and no impact
for out-of- school youth (Office of Chief Economist 1995; Bloom et al.
1993). Moreover, the evaluation precedes the Department of Labor's
emphasis on long-term training and the enactment of the 1992 JTPA
amendments.
Nonetheless, there has been considerable interest both in Congress
and within the Executive Branch in replacing JTPA with an
"improved" system. In this paper we consider three of the significant
changes that have been suggested by various parties. We first consider
the use of vouchers, where instead of having the program and the par-
ticipant jointly select the training to be undertaken, the participant
makes the selection. We then consider the strategy proposed by Con-
gress of making the programs less categorical and more block grants
where the states are given significantly more latitude in determining
who is served and how they are served. Finally, we discuss the utility
of one feature of the current JTPA system that is unlikely to survive a
switch to a purer block grant system-performance management.
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The Use of Vouchers
In the JTPA programs, as well as in the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) and Manpower Development and Training
Act (MDTA) programs that preceded JTPA, the type of training (e.g.,
classroom training or on-the-job training) and the specific vendor and
course are selected jointly by the local program and the participant,
with the program having primary responsibility. The Department of
Labor has recently proposed that responsibility for activity selection be
given exclusively to participants by providing them with vouchers
redeemable at local vendors, with the local employment and training
programs' responsibilities restricted to providing information about
potential service providers and their track records and providing coun-
seling and other support services when asked. Vouchers are a prominent
feature of the bill currently being considered by the House of Represen-
tatives, H.R. 1617 or the CAREERS Act; the Senate bill authorizes but
does not mandate the use of vouchers.
Although the Department of Labor has not worked out all the details
of how such a program might operate, it is worth considering what the
evidence shows about the track record of previous voucher programs
for training unemployed individuals. The initial appeal of vouchers is
quite strong. After all, the higher education system in the United States
functions reasonably well without local programs assigning people to
specific colleges and fields of study. The use of the GI Bill after World
War II by large numbers of veterans is always cited as a model system
of how well vouchers can accommodate the training needs of individu-
als. Finally, with the government stressing the importance of customer
satisfaction, it is simply more appealing to let people make their own
decisions on what to study and where to study it than to have program
officials or locally selected contractors dictate the choices.
As noted above, none of the principal national employment and
training programs have relied upon vouchers to match participants and
programs. Two employment and training programs, one a special pro-
gram carried out as part of a larger income maintenance experiment
and the other a training program for certain dislocated workers, made
use of an approach equivalent to vouchers. By examining the evidence
from the evaluations of these programs, we can get some idea on how
well vouchers might work for a broader-based program.
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The SIME-DIME Counseling and Education Subsidy Program
The first voucher-like training program of interest is the Counseling
and Education Subsidy Program (CESP) that was implemented along
with the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (often
referred to as SIME/DIME). SIME/DIME was the largest and last of a
series of experiments conducted in the 1960s and 1970s to learn about
the feasibility and behavioral implications of a "negative income tax"
program where members of the treatment group were provided a guar-
anteed income, and any income earned by the participants was taxed at
a specified rate. The SIME-DIME program was carried out between
1970 and 1978 in selected sections of Seattle and Denver. To be eligi-
ble for the program, a person had to meet the following requirements:
• Family income: below $9,000 (in current dollars) for a family of
four (adjusted for other family sizes)
• Family structure: restricted to married couples and single parents
with minor dependent children
• Race/ethnicity: family head had to be black or white in Seattle, and
black, white, or Chicano in Denver
• Characteristics of family head: between the ages of 18 and 58,
capable of employment, and not in military service (Christopher-
son 1983)
For the Counseling and Education Subsidy component of the exper-
iment, treatment and control group members were randomly assigned
to one of three counseling and training options:
• Counseling only
• Counseling plus a 50 percent subsidy for any education or training
in which the person enrolled
• Counseling plus a 100 percent subsidy for any education or train-
ing in which the person enrolled (Dickinson and West 1983)
Participants were enrolled in the experiment for up to six years.
Education was interpreted very broadly so that most occupational
training and general education courses were approved; most of the
training was occupational classroom training, and the community col-
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lege was the most common provider. Participation in subsidized train-
ing was moderate. For the group with a 100 percent subsidy, about 36
percent of the married men and women participated, and 47 percent of
the single female heads of household took some education or training.
Participation rates were lower for those granted a 50 percent subsidy-
21 percent for the married men and women and 35 percent for the sin-
gle female heads.
The hypothesis underlying the CESP was that the subsidies for
training would lead to increased participation in education and training
programs, which would, in tum, increase earnings. The first part of the
hypothesis was confirmed, with participants in the 100 percent subsidy
group taking approximately one year of additional training compared
to those with no subsidy. The surprising result was that in virtually all
the analyses undertaken, the training led to either no change in subse-
quent earnings or an actual reduction in earnings, although the negative
impacts were often not statistically significant. Dickinson and West
conclude:
Up to this point we have found that, as expected, the SIME/DIME
counseling and training programs increased the amount of job
counseling and the amount of additional schooling received. How-
ever, we have determined they also, quite unexpectedly, reduced
the earnings of those eligible to participate, with the exception of
the counseling-only program for single women. Further, we have
found that these negative impacts are widespread and that the pro-
grams, on the whole, were not beneficial even for select subgroups
of the population (again, with the exception of counseling only for
single women). Since these results are based on a comparison of
randomly assigned experiments and controls and thus are not a
result of the self-selection and noncomparability problems that
plague most other evaluations of employment and training pro-
grams, considerable reliance can be placed on these basic findings
(p.233).
Dickinson and West undertook a number of analyses to determine if
their findings somehow resulted from some type of statistical problem
or nonrandom selection. In the end, they concluded that the problem
was in the treatment itself:
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The SIME/DIME programs were designed to maximize freedom
of choice for participants. They offered nondirective counseling
and a wide range of educational opportunities. Evaluation indi-
cates that such programs in general are inappropriate for low-
income individuals, causing at least some of them to form unreal-
istic expectations about their labor market prospects and to pursue
overly ambitious goals (p. 253).
The voucher systems proposed in the current legislation may be even
less promising: participants will receive counseling only if they request
it.
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was established
in 1962 to provide financial assistance and training to workers who
lose their jobs as a result of imports. The program provides cash assis-
tance through Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA), and workers are
permitted to identify and select their own training program. The pro-
gram has been amended significantly several times in its history (Cor-
son et al. 1993). The qualifying criteria were liberalized in 1974. In
1981, TRA benefits were reduced to be the same as the worker's unem-
ployment insurance (UI) benefits, and workers could only collect TRA
after they had exhausted their unemployment insurance. Training was
made an entitlement and a requirement for workers on TAA beginning
in 1988. Although dislocated workers covered by TAA must have their
training approved by the employment service, the workers may choose
their own training, and the employment service generally concurs with
the workers' plans. Thus, the training component of TAA is essentially
a voucher-based training program for dislocated workers who lose
their job because of imports.
Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) completed an impact evalua-
tion of TAA training in 1992. The evaluation included four groups of
TAA recipients: participants who began receiving TRA benefits prior
to the 1988 changes, participants who received TAA training prior to
the 1988 changes, participants who began receiving TRA payments
after the 1988 changes, and participants who enrolled in TAA training
after the 1988 changes. The original design called for fifteen states to
be included in the study, but six states refused to participate and only
260 The Baby and the Bath Water
one was replaced, yielding a final sample of ten states. For comparison
groups, the MPR researchers selected samples of VI recipients
matched to the TAA samples on several criteria. The VI samples were
drawn from the same states and roughly the same time periods as the
TAA and TRA samples. The VI samples were drawn from manufactur-
ing because the TAA population had been displaced largely from man-
ufacturing jobs (85 percent in the TAA sample selected). Finally,
because workers had to exhaust their VI payments to collect TRA, the
analysis was restricted to VI exhaustees. The final analysis sample
included 4,776 individuals, of whom 1,174 were VI exhaustees and the
remainder were TRA recipients and TAA trainees. Data were gathered
primarily through telephone interviews and covered approximately
four years of experience.
The MPR study found that a substantial minority of TAA partici-
pants received training-37 percent in the pre-1988 sample (when
training was neither an entitlement nor a requirement) and 47 percent
in the post-1988 period when training was generally required but could
be waived. About 70 percent of the TAA trainees completed their train-
ing, with a slightly higher proportion of the pre- 1988 group (72 per-
cent) completing training than in the post-1988 group (67 percent). As
in most studies of dislocated workers, the MPR study found that partic-
ipants in TAA generally suffered substantial reductions in wage rates
and earnings following their job loss.
The MPR researchers used regression analysis of the TAA samples
and the VI exhaustee comparison group to estimate the impact of TAA
training on the employment and earnings of participants. The research-
ers found that when differences in characteristics between trainees and
others are controlled for, "our findings imply that, if training has a sub-
stantial positive effect on employment or earnings among all trainees,
it is realized not earlier than three years after the initial VI claim" (Cor-
son et al. 1993, p. 155). The study also found that individuals who
received training had slightly lower wage rates than those who did not
take training, but the differences were generally not statistically signif-
icant.
Although the TAA evaluation is another example of a voucher-like
program that failed to produce significant positive impacts on the
employment and earnings of trainees, the evidence here must be inter-
preted with caution for several reasons. First, the evaluation used a
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nonexperimental design, and the design may not have adequately con-
trolled for differences between the treatment and comparison groups.
Second, the evaluation may not have followed up the participants long
enough to measure any gains. Finally, the failure of the program to pro-
duce significant impacts may not have been due to the voucher aspect
of the program but to other features of the intervention. For example, in
the post-1988 period, training was a requirement, so the results may
not apply to a nonmandatory program. On the other hand, several other
evaluations of training programs for dislocated workers failed to find
significant positive impacts, so the problem may not result from the use
of vouchers (Office of Chief Economist 1995, p. 55).
Conclusions on Vouchers
We do not interpret the evidence presented here to indicate that
vouchers should never be used in training programs. For programs
focused on the general population and toward higher education rather
than occupational training, vouchers may be satisfactory. It is when we
consider the populations that have been of greatest interest for the
Department of Labor, the economically disadvantaged and dislocated
workers, that one has trouble finding any evidence that vouchers will
work. Based on recent experience in JTPA, one might speculate that a
move toward vouchers would be counterproductive. The 1992 JTPA
amendments required local service delivery areas (SDAs) to increase
the assessment provided to participants, and an ongoing evaluation of
the amendments indicates that most SDAs and states believe that the
increased assessment has been beneficial to the program. While causal-
ity cannot be established at this time, a reasonable case can be made
that for the economically disadvantaged population and perhaps dislo-
cated workers as well, we should stay with the current system of
enhanced assessment and training programs mutually agreed upon by
the program and the participant, rather than switching to a voucher sys-
tem where participants assume the major role in selecting their field of
study and service provider. If the Department of Labor is able to imple-
ment its proposals to establish one-stop career centers and provide
detailed performance ratings of all service providers, vouchers are
more likely to be useful, but there appears to be no rationale for haste.
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Block Grants to States
The major employment and training bills being considered by the
House and Senate at the time this paper was prepared, H.R. 1617 and
S. 143, reduce the federal role in overseeing and proscribing these pro-
grams, and they enhance the role of the states. The term "block grant"
is generally used to describe situations where federal funds for several
narrowly focused programs (often referred to as categorical programs)
are combined in a single grant with much of the responsibility for
design, focus, operation, and oversight transferred to the states or, less
frequently, to local levels of government. There are obviously degrees
to which a program is a block grant rather than categorical, with a pro-
gram being more of a block grant when the state or local governments
have more control over services to be provided, the target population,
accountability, and the way funds are allocated to lower levels of gov-
ernment. Thus, JTPA and its predecessor CETA are often classified as
block grants because they replaced a number of highly categorical pro-
grams (Hayes 1995). On the other hand, JTPA, and CETA before it,
has a number of separate titles and funding streams, strict targeting
requirements, a number of restrictions on the activities that can be car-
ried out with the federal funds, and a performance management system
with strong incentives. Thus, the General Accounting Office (1995, p.
22) quite correctly questions whether CETA-and by implication
JTPA as well-was truly a block grant program. Current proposals for
employment and training would replace JTPA with one or more pro-
grams giving increased responsibility to the states and fewer require-
ments for targeting, services, and accountability. In the remainder of
this section, we review the evidence on the likely effects of moving
toward a pure block grant system for employment and training.
Although block grants were first proposed as early as 1949, the first
three block grant programs were established in the 1970s under Presi-
dent Nixon: CETA, the Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG), and the Social Service Block Grants (established under Title
XX of the Social Security Act). The next round of block grants was
instituted under President Reagan. Nine block grant programs were
created in 1981, and there are currently fifteen block grant programs in
effect (General Accounting Office 1995, pp. 22-24).
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In this section several of the effects of block grants are considered.
We first examine what happens to funding levels for activities under
block grants. We then consider the savings that some analysts have
speculated will result from the use of block grants and program consol-
idation. Finally, we discuss how the potential benefits of block grants
may erode over time as Congress changes the program. A fourth issue
of importance-accountability-is considered in the next section
because it is discussed in more depth.
Federal and State Funding Levels
As Peterson and Nightingale (1995) have noted, there is nothing
inherent in block grants that requires any change in the level of federal
support. During the Nixon era, funding was increased when block
grants were implemented,. but the Reagan block grants were accompa-
nied by program cuts. In the current environment, any movement more
toward the block grant end of the funding spectrum for employment
and training programs is likely to be accompanied by a reduction in
funding. However, given pressure on the federal budget and criticisms
by GAO and others, it is possible that these reductions in spending
would occur in any event.
The Reagan round of block grants did not fare particularly ~ell over
the decade after they were established. The General Accounting Office
(1995) notes that the block grants established in 1981 were funded 12
percent less in 1982 than the categorical programs they replaced. Peter-
son and Nightingale (1995) find that for the decade following their
establishment, funding generally declined for these programs, while
Nathan (1995) characterizes the programs as growing "slowly, if at
all." Peterson and Nightingale also note that during this period total
federal grants to state and local governments increased by over 100
percent, providing additional evidence that programs replaced by block
grants do not fare well in terms of federal funding.
Although some observers feared that the states would not make up
for much of the reductions that resulted when block grants replaced
categorical programs in the 1980s, both the General Accounting Office
(1995) and Peterson and Nightingale (1995) found that states made up
for a significant share of lost federal funds. State willingness to replace
lost federal funds was not universal, however, and the programs that
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fared best were those that state governments had traditionally adminis-
tered, while those that fared worst were ones where there had been lit-
tle state involvement or where the funds had largely been passed
through to the local level. Employment and training programs fit more
into the latter category, so it is reasonable to expect declines in state
support.
Administrative Cost Savings
Claims have sometimes been made that the block grant approach
can lead to significant savings in operating programs. The General
Accounting Office (1994) has encouraged such thinking by noting in
the title of one of its reports that "overlapping programs can add
unnecessary administrative costs"; if one reads the report, however,
one discovers that GAO did not conduct any study of administrative
savings from program consolidation but simply assumed that savings
would result. A recent analysis of this issue by Pindus and Nightingale
(1994) indicates that, for several reasons, the savings might not be as
great as many analysts have supposed. First, administrative costs are
generally a small fraction of total expenditures, often around 10 to 15
percent, so the base for potential savings is limited. Second, to the
extent that programs are already coordinated in terms of paperwork
and service delivery, there are limited benefits to be realized. Pindus
and Nightingale conclude:
Even under scenarios where there could be some administrative
cost savings, though, the amount of savings is not likely to be
great. Much of the expected savings would occur at the state level,
but total state level administrative costs represent a very small per-
centage of total program costs to begin with (generally one to two
percent of all costs). Even if half of all administrative costs at the
state level were saved as a result of consolidation, that would still
represent only about one percent of total federal program expendi-
tures for all programs consolidated. Under the best-case scenario,
there might also be some small savings at the local level. If, hypo-
thetically, 20 percent of the local administrative costs could be
saved, this might translate into a savings of 2-4 percent of total
federal program expenditures for all programs consolidated
(1995, p. 29).
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Moreover, to the extent that state and local governments must learn new
tasks and assume responsibilities formerly held by the federal govern-
ment, cost might be expected to increase, at least in the short run.
Eroding Program Flexibility
While there is not a great deal of evidence regarding how well the
states have performed in implementing block grant programs, Peterson
et al. (1986, p. 28) concluded that "states have done at least as good a
job in administration as the federal government had done formerly." In
spite of this, there has been a tendency for recategorization of pro-
grams shortly after the establishment of block grants. Hayes (1995, pp.
15-16) refers to this phenomenon as "categorical creep," and she notes
that between 1980 (prior to the Reagan block grants) and 1994, the
number of categorical programs serving children and families
increased from about 300 to nearly 500 in 1994. The General Account-
ing Office (1995, p. 40) notes that between 1983 and 1991 block grant
programs were amended 58 times, adding or modifying cost ceilings,
eligibility requirements, or imposing other categorical restrictions on
the states.
The reason for the recategorization is not hard to identify. As GAO
points out, block grants provide the states with increased flexibility
and, generally, less accountability. This combination invariably leads
to some instances of "bad judgment" by the states where for better or
for worse they make changes that Congress does not approve of, result-
ing in recategorization of programs by Congress. Illustrations in the
employment and training area are easy to find. The major restrictions
in CETA beginning with the 1978 amendments and the 1992 amend-
ments to JTPA resulted from state and local governments using their
flexibility to run programs contrary to the wishes of Congress (and in
some instances contrary to good judgment). Thus, even though the
National JTPA Study found JTPA to be most effective for adults
assigned to on-the-job training (OJT) or job search assistance, these
programs were strongly discouraged by the 1992 amendments because
the Office of the Inspector General and GAO discovered some abuses
of OJT, e.g., three-month dishwasher OJT contracts, and participants
receiving only job search assistance were not receiving actual training,
contrary to the desires of Congress.
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Conclusions on Block Grants
It is not clear how much of the current interest in making the
nation's employment and training system more of a block grant stems
from a desire to improve the program and how much is simply an
excuse to reduce the budget. The evidence suggests that increasing
state responsibility and flexibility has some advantages in terms of
administrative efficiency, but there is little evidence that cost savings
will result, and, based on past experience, there is a good likelihood
that recategorization will occur. In addition, if states are given
increased flexibility on targeting, services, and sub-state distribution,
the federal government should be prepared to live with the results.
Thus, we believe that decisions on budget levels should be made inde-
pendently of block grant features. In addition, as is addressed in more
detail below, increasing the state role without maintaining or enhanc-
ing accountability has been shown to be a recipe for program disaster.
Employment and Training Performance Management
Legislative proposals now circulating in Congress have the potential
for substantially altering, and possibly all but eliminating, the perfor-
mance management system which has been developed over the past
decade for JTPA and more recently for a number of related employ-
ment and training (E&T) programs. Whether these pending actions
represent a serious threat to the performance of E&T programs
depends both on whether the performance management systems have
been appropriately designed and on whether these designs have had the
intended effects in promoting improved performance.
This section provides a review of recent experience with perfor-
mance management in E&T programs. First, we review the essential
components of these systems. Second, we examine the performance
system established for JTPA. Third, we document what is known about
the effects the JTPA system has had on participants served, services
provided, and key program outcomes. Then, we highlight several
national and state-based initiatives underway that are enhancing and
changing the focus of E&T performance management. Many of these
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appear to be heading very much in the direction suggested by the rhet-
oric, if not the reality, of E&T reform bills in this Congress. Finally, we
review the congressionally proposed changes to E&T performance
management and offer observations concerning their possible impacts.
Essential Components ofE&T Performance Management
Barnow (1992) suggested that three essential components character-
ize E&T performance management systems, as follows:
• Performance measures, one or more measures related closely to
the actual performance expected of the programs:
• Methods for setting performance standards based on each of the
selected measures, specific standards of acceptable performance,
set rationally and developed so as to be understood by the (state
and substate) programs being judged; and
• Rewards and sanctions tied to actual performance against stan-
dards.
A fourth component, implicit in the three listed, is that a perfor-
mance management system should also be firmly grounded in a perfor-
mance management philosophy. This philosophy should clearly
articulate to all of the actors involved exactly what is expected of each
at all levels; the particular measures, standards, and adjustment mecha-
nisms; the consequences of performance, whether good or bad; how
the performance management system is intended to lead to just what
type of performance over time; and the rationale for all of these ele-
ments. There are any number of alternative philosophies of and
approaches to performance management, tailored to varying operating
contexts (e.g., centralized/decentralized decision making, funding mix,
service constraints).
Three rationales have been offered for establishing performance
management systems, suggesting some of the steps towards the requi-
site philosophy, including: identifying poor performers and taking cor-
rective action; identifying and rewarding good performers; and
modifying the objective function of the programs, in laymen's terms,
bringing state and local program goals and objectives in line with
national program aims.
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Typically (and appropriately), the skeleton of a performance man-
agement philosophy is only partially outlined in legislation; the sys-
tem's meat is added through regulations, associated technical
assistance guides, training sessions, and ongoing dialogues engaging
all major national, state, and substate policy makers, administrators,
and service providers. Workable, effective systems are rarely top-down
affairs; rather, they can be characterized as top-down/bottom-up. As
such, they enjoy substantial "buy-in" from all of the affected parties.
The Current JTPA Performance Management System
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, JTPA had the only compre-
hensive performance management system of any E&T program in the
country (King 1988). Now, however, a number of other E&T pro-
grams-adult and vocational education, the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills (JOBS) training program for Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children recipients, and the Food Stamp E&T program-have at
least begun to construct their own systems. The JTPA system is exam-
ined here; none of the others can yet match it for completeness or for
responsiveness to changing conditions (Baj, Sheets, and Trott 1994).
Building on the pilot experience under CETA, JTPA's performance
management system was ushered in July 1983 and has been modified
in response to research findings, reviews by national blue ribbon com-
missions, and extensive feedback from state and local programs. The
latest changes resulted from the passage of the 1992 JTPA Reform
Amendments. JTPA's performance management system at present is
comprised of the following key components:
• Clearly articulated goals and objectives, i.e., increased employ-
ment and earnings and reductions in welfare dependency
• Performance measures and associated standards, developed
through a highly participatory, top-downlbottom-up policy process
with considerable input from the research community; JTPA's
measures and standards now encompass both process (e.g., access/
equity of service) and outcome (e.g., youth employability enhance-
ment, rates of employment and earnings levels, since 1988 cap-
tured at follow-up for adults and adult welfare recipients) measures
for adults and youth
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• A performance standards adjustment model with which governors
may adjust performance standards for their local programs to
account for economic conditions (e.g., high unemployment, low
wages) and population constraints that lie beyond their control
• Performance incentives and sanctions tied to local performance
against standards, typically as adjusted by the Secretary's perfor-
mance standards model
• Clearly sorted performance management roles and responsibilities
among the program's key players, including the federal govern-
ment, governors, local private industry councils, and program
administrators and service providers
• Ongoing technical assistance and training (TAT) on performance
standards and their use, led by USDOLIETA and assisted by states,
national associations, consultants, and researchers
JTPA's approach is based on several key principles. First, to the
extent feasible, measures and standards should proxy for the desired
net impact on employment and earnings. Second, unintended negative
effects should be avoided. For example, despite the fact that cost and
change (in employment, earnings, and welfare dependency) measures
were 'specifically called for in legislation, the former were tried but
subsequently dropped when field research found their use was
prompting the pursuit of low-intensity service strategies (SRI and
Berkeley Planning Associates 1988); the latter were considered but
never implemented because research suggested that change measures
would lead to participant "creaming" and serving those who would
have done well absent services. Third, underlying JTPA's system is the
private sector notion that, given clear goals, objectives, and standards
of performance and guidance on operating parameters, local officials
should be allowed the flexibility to decide how to operate, as well as to
enjoy the fruits of their success or suffer the consequences of their
failure. Responses to program failure include both technical assistance,
a relatively positive approach geared towards improvement, as well as
program reorganization, the negative option, for continued
nonperformance.
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Effects ofE&T Performance Management
JTPA is the only E&T program with sufficient experience in perfor-
mance management to support an assessment of its effects. Barnow
(1992) and Dickinson et al. (SRI and Berkeley Planning Associates
1988) provide evidence on this issue. Technical issues (e.g., estimation
biases, measurement error, omitted variables) aside, several key find-
ings emerge from this research.
First, for all its faults, JTPA's performance management system--
including its principal measures--enjoys widespread acceptance
among those who must work within and around its confines. This sug-
gests that JTPA's system has met an important test: it has been widely
accepted as valid by those who are an integral part of it.
Second, when Dickinson and her colleagues conducted the legisla-
tively mandated evaluation of the effects of JTPA standards on clients,
services, and costs for the National Commission for Employment Pol-
icy, they found that standards were not the culprit they had sometimes
been made out to be. Local JTPA programs (known as service delivery
areas or SDAs) balanced at least three different sets of objectives, the
first centered around clients' needs and serving particular client
groups; the second around employer needs and interests; and the last
more narrowly focused on achieving specific JTPA performance levels.
Given that national performance standards for JTPA have been pegged
at relatively low ("minimally acceptable") levels, their major conclu-
sions were not surprising. Their findings suggest that local JTPA pro-
grams that have a strong sense of their goals and objectives, understand
their target populations and local labor markets, and pay attention to
providing appropriate E&T services will not have their programs dis-
torted (in terms of clients, services, or costs) by the application of per-
formance standards.
Third, on one of the more important issues-whether program ter-
mination and immediate postprogram performance indicators are suffi-
ciently good "proxies" of the desired longer-term net impacts on
participant employment, earnings, and welfare dependency-the jury
is still out. Considerable research has been conducted around this
issue, beginning with the pioneering study by Boros (1978). (See also
Gay and Boros 1980; Geraci 1984; and Friedlander 1988). These stud-
ies have used varying methodologies applied to different programs and
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had access to differing gross/net impact estimates, with understandably
different results. We do not yet know definitively that managing
-towards the current set of immediate and near-term measures and stan-
dards yields the desired net impacts; however, as the Secretary of
Labor's JTPA Advisory Committee strongly recommended in 1989, a
combination of tightening up eligibility at the front end (e.g., ensuring
that participants are truly in need) and tightening up program perfor-
mance measurement at the back end (e.g., stricter, more tightly defined
outcome measures) will minimize problems associated with "cream-
ing," serving those most likely to succeed, usually in order to produce
better gross results in the short term.
Finally, it is helpful to close by listing the five major lessons
USDOL (l994d) says it has learned over the course of implementing
JTPA performance standards:
• performance standards drive program behavior
• performance standards should clearly reflect policy goals
• performance management incentives get results
• keep it simple
• performance standards are part of systemwide management
Promising Recent Initiatives
This appears to be a period of actively "groping along" towards a
new performance management paradigm for E&T programs. The
emerging paradigm is both more encompassing and complete than the
current ones, and is more closely aligned with leading private sector
practices. The passage of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 indicates that this is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable
future. Under this act, federal agencies must develop outcome-based
goals, systematically measure their performance, and report on their
progress. A number of promising recent initiatives are highlighted
here.
Cross-Program Performance Management Initiatives. Even before
USDOL began promoting the one-stop career center approach to ser-
vice delivery, a number of states (notably New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Texas) had launched their own efforts to rationalize their E&T
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operations and to deliver services in a more "seamless" fashion. They
also began grappling with ways to manage these programs better,
whether or not they had placed them under a common roof. Some
states (Oregon, for instance) established so-called human resource
investment councils, overarching councils which oversaw planning for
and conducted oversight across major E&T programs. Subsequent pas-
sage of the 1992 JTPA Reform Amendments encouraged other states to
follow suit, and approximately fifteen states, beginning with Texas,
have done so.
Second, the 1992 amendments also mandated the identification of a
"core set of consistently defined data elements" for the major federal
E&T programs. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Health and
Human Services, and Labor, joined by other partner agencies and orga-
nizations, launched this effort and produced a report identifying these
core elements and setting forth recommended definitions for them
(USDOL 1994a). The National Governors' Association, one of the
partner organizations, engaged several states (notably Texas, Iowa,
North Carolina, and Indiana) in an intensive eighteen-month project to
implement core data elements and performance measures. For exam-
ple, Texas has adopted five common outcome measures for gauging the
performance of its JTPA, JOBS, Food Stamp, E&T, Adult and Voca-
tional Education, and other programs.
Third, the National Commission on Employment Policy, joined by a
group of policy researchers and several key states, pushed to maximize
the use of unemployment insurance (UI) wage records-data already
collected in support of UI benefits administration in each state-as a
cost-effective, objective, and easily accessible mechanism for tracking
longer-term employment and earnings outcomes for participants termi-
nating from the various E&T programs (NCEP 1991, 1992). The avail-
ability of quarterly UI wage records in nearly all states is a recent
phenomenon, a product of the 1988 amendments to JTPA; the 1992
JTPA Amendments bolstered institutional support for their use. This
effort has emphasized tracking and evaluation options for JTPA, but its
applicability extends across many of the other E&T programs as well.
UI wage records have the potential to serve as a form of "common cur-
rency" for gauging E&T program performance.
Skills Standards. One of the missing pieces in E&T program perfor-
mance management systems to date has been that, despite a private
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sector role in their application (especially in JTPA), standards were
largely independent of performance expectations for jobs in the labor
market. That is, while local E&T programs could be judged successful
in terms of programmatically based standards (i.e., having exceeded
the established employment rates or earnings levels), many participants
might well be unable to meet the on-the-job requirements of private (or
even public) sector employers. The Secretary's Commission on
Achieving Necessary Skills report (U.S. Department of Labor 1991)
recognized this issue.
A joint effort to develop industry-based occupational skills stan-
dards and certification was begun by the U.S. Departments of Educa-
tion and Labor in 1992. Industry-led projects were funded in numerous
industries (e.g., electronics) "to establish model frameworks that define
recognized occupations, establish world-class occupational skill stan-
dards, and provide the basis for program accreditation and individual
certification" (Baj, Sheets, and Trott 1994, p. 41). Subsequently, The
Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994 encouraged the creation of a
national system of voluntary skill standards, to be led by industry, and
also called for the creation of a National Skills Standards Board. The
School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 then encouraged states to
develop their own skill standards and to link them to the standards
emanating from the national Goals 2000 efforts. Whether Congress
will continue to support these initiatives is doubtful.
Convergence with Private Sector Performance Management.
Another initiative worth noting is the convergence of private and public
sector (especially E&T program) thinking regarding how best to man-
age performance. Both the language and practice of E&T performance
management are now much closer to those of leading private sector
enterprises. The publication of such popular works as In Search of
Excellence by Peters and Waterman (1982) and Reinventing Govern-
ment by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) has certainly helped. Elements of
this convergence can be seen in the growing emphasis on continuous
improvement over time (as distinct from simply meeting a given year's
performance standard); quality assurance and quality generally (as
compared to focusing on USDOL/ETA's "minimally-acceptable per-
formance"); and customer satisfaction and related management feed-
back systems (in contrast to passive participant follow-up surveys).
USDOL has actively pursued these new elements of performance man-
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agement in ways readily apparent in its One-Stop Career Center
Projects around the country; the National Governors' Association and
other organizations have been key proponents as well.
Possible "Reform" Impacts
Both the House and Senate bills proposing to reform the nation's
workforce education and training programs are short on details, partic-
ularly in terms of performance management, making an assessment of
the possible impacts of reform difficult. The two leading bills are H.R.
1617, the Consolidated and Reformed Education, Employment, and
Rehabilitation Systems (or CAREERS) Act in the House (the
McKeon-Goodling bill); and S. 143, the Workforce Development Act
in the Senate (the Kassebaum bill). H.R. 1617 would consolidate E&T
programs into four state block grants (by target group); require that
services be delivered via one-stop centers operating under required
local boards; and place heavy emphasis on vouchers for adult training.
S. 143 would create a federal-level governing board; consolidate some-
what fewer programs into a single state block grant (with two funding
streams), organized around core activities; and allow the establishment
of local boards and the use of vouchers.
Key points concerning the relevant performance-related provisions
in these bills include the following:
• At the federal level, the Secretaries of Education and Labor would
work to set "world-class" performance levels to ensure a national
performance system in H.R. 1617, while S. 143 would give the
major performance management role--including "negotiating"
state performance benchmarks--to a newly constituted public/pri-
vate, executive/congressional governing board.
• States have a very active role in S. 143, setting appropriate perfor-
mance benchmarks, among other functions; in H.R. 1617, states
set core indicators, but local boards develop the performance mea-
sures.
• H.R. 1617, which requires the use of vouchers, also mandates a
system of provider certification.
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• Both versions have provlslOns for performance incentives or
bonuses and would reduce an area's basic resources a substantial
amount for continued nonperformance.
There are major shortcomings in these bills from a performance
management perspective. First, both are disturbingly vague on purpose,
goals, and objectives, as well as the approach that would be put in place
to measure them. As Sum and Harrington (1995) point out, these bills
not only appear to give a much larger performance management role to
states (and localities in the House bill), but they retreat noticeably from
the important federal role which has been asserted over the years, i.e.,
establishing E&T program goals and objectives, and ensuring that data
systems were in place throughout the system to measure performance
reliably and consistently. The system envisioned in the Senate bill has
many of the trappings of that now in place in vocational education. Not
only did it take several attempts over several decades to get clear perfor-
mance management provisions in federal law, but once enacted (1990),
the weak federal role it embodies has allowed states such wide leeway
that it is difficult for potential students to know what the system is pro-
ducing from state to state or community to community. This might be
understandable in vocational education where federal funds comprise a
very small fraction of the total, but in federal block grants with few
matching requirements, it makes very little sense.
Second, the private sector role in performance management, which
has been a centerpiece of the USDOL approach since the early 1980s,
is lacking altogether in these bills. This sends the wrong signal to the
nation's E&T programs.
Third, while it is encouraging that H.R. 1617 would mandate a
mechanism for provider certification to accompany its voucher
approach, this only goes part of the way. As indicated above, the effec-
tiveness of vouchers remains largely untested with poor target popula-
tions with low literacy and other barriers. The experiences many states
and the federal government have had with proprietary schools and
school loans are suggestive of some of the problems that can occur.
Performance information alone is not sufficient. Given the complexity
of the investment decisions individuals are being asked to make for
their careers, greater emphasis will be needed on counseling them con-
cerning choices and their consequences, interpreting the available
information on provider performance.
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Fourth, both bills would effect cuts in an area's basic resource allo-
cation for continued nonperformance, an action which penalizes those
in need of services as much as it does local program staff and, by asso-
ciation, local elected officials. Positive approaches (incentives) are far
more productive than negative ones at eliciting the desired program
response. Further, cutting into base area funding allocations is ill-
advised. These are lessons with strong private sector parallels as well.
Finally, neither bill addresses what USDOL and the JTPA system
have begun to acknowledge as crucial to achieving desired perfor-
mance levels over time, constructing mechanisms to assure quality and
foster continuous improvement. These principles come out of leading-
edge practices in the private sector, e.g., Total Quality Management (or
TQM) or the international ISO 9000 effort. In all fairness, none of the
nation's E&T programs, including JTPA, has done well in these areas.
A crucial missing ingredient in continuous improvement is a network
of technology diffusion centers which can help to interpret and com-
municate new findings (research and development)-about effective
program interventions and innovative service delivery practices-to
state and local E&T programs, as well as provide technical assistance
and training when needed to assist in implementing them. Parallels can
be found in the nation's networks of Agricultural Experiment Stations
and Education Service Centers, as well as in the system of Manpower
Institutional Grantees (or MIGs) that existed under CETA.
In summary, these E&T "reform" proposals represent considerable
regression from the system now in place for JTPA and would amount
to disregarding years of progress built upon hard-learned lessons and
the emulation 'of leading-edge national and international practices. It
would be a terrible irony to choose to revert to a fragmented, state-
based E&T system, featuring inconsistently measured performance
against incompletely defined goals and objectives, when, in the face of
increasing economic globalization, many of our trading partners are
going the other way.
Concluding Observations
We have examined several topics now featured prominently in the
national debate over the future of E&T programs, namely vouchers,
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block grants, and performance management. The evidence on the effi-
cacy of vouchers for providing services to low-income populations is
limited, and the evidence that is available is not encouraging. Relying
on vouchers as the principal mechanism for providing E&T services
for key E&T target populations might well prove counterproductive. In
addition, past experience with using block grants for E&T and related
programs also suggests little room for optimism. The current move to
legislate E&T block grants may be largely a product of the desire to cut
federal expenditures in this policy area. We should not expect turning
to block grants to yield measurable savings in administrative costs or to
produce substantially better decision making on the part of state and
local governments who would inherit the newly devolved responsibil-
ity for E&T program decisions.
The JTPA program in particular has established a reputation for pro-
gram accountability. It did so early in its implementation and has con-
tinued to do so over the years, learning from its mistakes, building on
its successes, and emulating some of the best private sector perfor-
mance management practices. JTPA's performance management
approach is not without its faults (or its critics), but is by far the best
such system yet implemented in the E&T realm. Leading congres-
sional proposals to reform E&T programs are remarkably vague and
ill-defined in terms of performance management, leaving much to be
desired. In addition, JTPA's record for adults has shown continuous
improvement in recent years. The table below shows how wages at
placement and length of stay have steadily increased for adults
between 1989 and 1993
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Average length of stay
for adults (in weeks) 12 24 27 28 33a
Average wage at
placement for adults $5.64 $5.85 $6.08 $6.40 $6.87
a. Length of stay for 1993 may not be stnctly comparable to data from earher years
There is a disturbing incongruity between the visions being pursued
by the new leadership in Congress and the perspectives of researchers,
policy analysts, and practitioners. Even with E&T vouchers and block
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grants, we would still need ways to demonstrate to taxpayers and the
Congress that services are being effectively delivered both in the
present and over time. It is unclear how this can be accomplished
absent tightly defined standards and consistently measured perfor-
mance across states. We sincerely hope that cutting federal expendi-
tures on E&T programs is not a hidden aim of the current fervor for
E&T program and other block grants. We should stop to ask whether it
makes sense to throw out the baby with the bath water.
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